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Abstract: The phenomenon of encountering instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs) while
operating an aircraft under visual flight rules (VFRs) remains a primary area of concern. Studies have
established that pilots operating under VFRs that continue to operate under IMCs remains a significant
cause of accidents in general aviation (GA), resulting in hundreds of fatalities. This research used
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) database, which contained a total of 196 VFR to IMC
occurrences, from 2003 to 2019, with 26 having formal reports. An explanatory design was adopted,
commencing with a qualitative study of the 26 occurrences with reports followed by a quantitative
study of all 196 occurrences. Factors investigated included the locations and date of the occurrences,
involved aircraft (manufacturer, model, type), pilot details (licenses, ratings, h, and medical), number
of fatalities, and causal factors. Fisher’s exact tests were used to highlight significant relationships.
Results showed occurrences were more likely to end fatally if (1) they involved private operations,
(2) pilots only had a night VFR rating, (3) the pilot chose to push on into IMCs, (4) the pilot did
not undertake proper preflight planning consulting aviation weather services, and (5) the pilot
had more than 500 h of flight experience. Further results showed occurrences were less likely to
end fatally if the meteorological condition was clouds without precipitation, if the pilot held a full
instrument rating, or the pilot was assisted via radio. Analysis of the data using the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework revealed that errors and violations occur
with slightly greater frequency for fatal occurrences than non-fatal occurrences. Quantitative analyses
demonstrated that the number of VFR to IMC occurrences have not decreased even though initiatives
have been implemented in an attempt to address the issue.
Keywords: accidents; aviation; HFACS; safety occurrences; visibility; weather

1. Introduction
Meteorological conditions that are hazardous for GA include phenomena such as turbulence,
lightening, wind shear, and icing. Clouds reduce visibility and make navigational awareness difficult.
This can lead to misinterpretation of aircraft positions [1] and possible controlled flight into terrain
(CFIT) accidents as well as disorientation and possible departure from controlled flight. Pilots perform
numerous weather-related tasks both before and during flight so as to avoid weather hazards.
Flight planning involves interpreting weather forecasts and weather information and integrating them
into flight decisions [2]. However, despite the fundamental nature of these activities, weather-related
GA accidents remain significant, with high fatality rates.
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GA pilots flying into instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs) whilst operating under visual
flight rules (VFRs) and being restrained to visual meteorological conditions (VMCs) remains a leading
and continuing cause of accidents [3]. According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [4], this
is “one of the most consistently lethal mistakes in all of aviation” with 86% of occurrences resulting in
fatalities. The United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) estimates that of the GA
accidents that occur in IMCs, two-thirds will be fatal. This is far higher than the overall rate for GA
accidents [5], including fatalities from mid-air collisions, wire strikes, or pilot incapacitation [4].
When pilots continue with a VFR flight into IMCs (VFR2IMC), they can experience spatial
disorientation and may lose control of the aircraft, which can lead to an unrecoverable flight attitude
or in-flight structural failures [6]. Although there are varying estimations in the literature, most
researchers have established that 60–80% of GA accidents are attributable, in some part, to human
errors [7]. From NASA’s voluntary reporting system (ASRS) 70% of reported incidents are said to
have been caused by “human error” and “pilot error” [8]. The role human factors play in safety
occurrences can be analyzed using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).
HFACS was adopted by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) in 1998 as a human error taxonomy for
identifying accident and incident causal factors attributed to humans in aviation and other high-risk
industries [9]. HFACS, originally developed for military aviation, has 19 causal categories; however,
most GA accidents are analyzed only using the lower two tiers of HFACS (unsafe acts of Operations
and Preconditions for Unsafe Acts) which includes ten causal categories. These are skill-based errors,
decision errors, perceptual errors, violations, adverse mental states, physical/mental limitations, crew
resource management, personal readiness, and technological environment. Of these, the unsafe acts
include skill-based errors (clearance, altitude/clearance, aircraft control), decision errors (VFR2IMC,
in-flight planning, weather decision), perceptual error (aircraft control, altitude, descent), and violations
(VFR2IMC) are the most relevant to VFR2IMC safety occurrences [9].
This research utilized a total of 196 safety occurrences for the quantitative study, with 26 of these
having official reports for use in the qualitative study. The safety occurrences covered a period from
2003 to 2019 from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to examine the factors associated with
VFR2IMC occurrences. The reports were subjected to qualitative and ex post facto quantitative analysis
to demonstrate the causal factors behind occurrences in addition to the application of the HFACS
framework to isolate the human factors. For the quantitative study, the features of the 196 occurrences
were analyzed to find statistically significant features in the dataset. The primary research question
for this work is, “how do weather, aircraft, pilot, and operational factors contribute to Australian
VFR2IMC occurrences?”. The secondary research question for this work is, “how do the distributions of
contributing factors in Australian VFR2IMC occurrences differ to those expected?”. The key hypotheses
posed initially are (1) that pilot experience should reduce the likelihood of experiencing VFR2IMC,
(2) student pilots involved in solo training exercises are more likely to encounter VFR2IMC, and (3) the
type of GA aircraft should have no influence on the likelihood of experiencing VFR2IMC.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Weather and Transport Accidents
Weather is a safety consideration across all transportation. Most people will have experience
weather while driving and are inherently aware that it influences their performance and decision
making, which has been studied objectively [10]. The sensitivity to weather effects is amplified in
trucks because of their larger size and higher center of gravity [11]. When looking at train accidents in
the United States, it was found that 1% of derailments from 2001 to 2010, 43, were the result of weather
alone [12]. There are a number of weather factors that affect railway safety (temperature, ice, fog, wind,
and precipitation) across a number of operational aspects (equipment, maintenance, train movements,
and management) [13]. Similarly, for shipping accidents, “4.33% of accidents occurred under adverse
weather conditions” [14]. Other work on maritime accidents in adverse weather conditions has
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investigated the influence on the type of shipping operation, the type of accident, and the location of
the accidents [15]. In aviation, weather is responsible for accidents and incidents across the industry,
which result from turbulence, downdrafts, wind shear, precipitation, icing, reduced visibility, and low
ceiling, amongst others [16].
2.2. VFRs into IMCs
An analysis of the NTSB aviation accidents database over the 1990–1997 period showed that 2.5% of
the reviewed 14,000 accidents involved VFR2IMC. These contributed to 11% of fatalities in that period.
Other accidents from GA not involving VFR2IMC accounted for 18% of the fatality rate as compared
to 75% of all the VFR2IMC accidents being fatal, indicating higher levels of fatalities in VFR2IMC
accidents compared to other accident types [17]. The 24th Nall Report analyzed 50 weather-related
accidents and found that 46% involved VFR2IMC, and 95% of these VFR2IMC accidents resulted
in fatalities [18]. Studies performed in Canada, from 1975 to 1985, showed that VFR2IMC accidents
accounted for 6% of all accidents [19] but 26% of all fatalities, while an analysis of 491 accidents from
the ATSB database between 1976 and 2003 showed that 75.6% of VFR2IMC accidents were fatal [20].
In 2001, Goh and Wiegman observed that the pilots who continued with flight into IMCs had
higher ratings of skill and judgment, indicating a self-perception of higher confidence in their aptitude
to fly the aircraft even in adverse weather conditions [17]. Despite the high level of confidence, these
pilots made errors early in the decision-making process, particularly inaccurate assessments of visibility.
The researchers classified the factors contributing to VFR2IMC as situation assessment, risk perception,
and decision framing.
Accidents caused by pilots who continue a VFR flight into adverse weather conditions have
been linked to errors in assessing the situation, as such, the continued flight into IMCs is due
to the inaccurate assessment of the hazard [3]. Of the accidents analyzed, 22% were caused by
human errors due to diagnostic errors, and these accidents were more serious than those caused by
aircraft-handling errors. Inaccurate situational assessment can be associated with a lack of experience
in the interpretation of changing weather conditions, the pilot being unable to recognize the gradual
transitions of deteriorating weather conditions from minimum VFRs to marginal VFRs and then
worsening to IMCs. This inexperience makes it difficult to discriminate weather conditions and
also contributes to poor hazard awareness [21]. These can be exacerbated by tiredness, fatigue, and
workload. On the other hand, a pilot’s risk perception may predispose them to continue a VFR2IMC.
This occurs when pilots make an accurate assessment of the hazard situation but continues flight into
adverse weather conditions due to overconfidence in their ability and unrealistic optimism about
being able to control the aircraft and avoid personal harm [17]. Studies have shown that pilots who
have gone through advanced training may exhibit excessive optimism, reluctance to admit limited
capability, and poor appreciation of hazards [22].
Goh and Wiegman also identified motivational factors [17], where even though pilots had
diagnosed the situation and the level of risk accurately, they continued VFR2IMC, driven by motivational
factors. Finally, with regard to decision framing and based on prospect theory [23], a pilot may choose
between a high-risk and low-risk course of action depending on their framing of whether the decision
will lead to gain or loss. Therefore, continuing into deteriorating weather conditions may be based
on the framing that diverting the flight may lead to a loss in time, money, or effort. If the decision to
divert is framed as safe, the pilot may discontinue the VFR2IMC.
Noting the lack of qualitative studies and the dominance of quantitative and mixed-method
approaches in examining the causal factors behind general aviation accidents, Gallo et al. used a
phenomenological approach to describe the experiences of 11 male pilots who had previously flown
VFR2IMC during their career and then used grounded theory in developing conjectures from the
participants’ responses [21]. The findings showed that even though the pilots had received weather
briefing, none of them expected nor anticipated IMCs. The pilots also indicated that they had
recognized weather changes en route, and reacted either by avoiding or escaping these. Some pilots
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submitted post-flight reports of IMCs while others did not, but the experienced heightened their
sense of situational awareness and led to a greater appreciation of the weather as well as the need for
alternative planning [21].
Major et al. [3], used a mixed-method approach to identify causal factors that led to VFR2IMC
aircraft accidents using data from the NTSB and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety
Institute databases. The findings showed that over the ten-year period, there were 1100 weather-related
accidents and that the number of accidents classified as VFR2IMC averaged 31.9 per year. A comparison
of the accidents involving instrument-rated and non-instrument-rated pilots indicated that 67.4% of the
total number of accidents were caused by pilots without an instrument rating. Further, the total number
of flight h was associated with continuing VFR2IMC, with 23.4% of the pilots involved having less than
250 h total flight time, 17.7% (250–500 h), 20.3% (500–1000 h), 13.3% (1000–2000 h), 11.7% (2000–5000 h),
6.3% (5000–10,000 h), and 7% having more than 10,000 h of total flight time [3]. These results suggest
that pilots with less than 1000 total flight hours are more likely to continue VFR2IMC in deteriorating
weather conditions. Studies conducted at Illinois University demonstrated that pilots with inadequate
instrument flight training lose control of aircraft in IMC situations or hit the ground in 178 s [6].
2.3. Contributing Factors
2.3.1. Overconfidence
The decision making of pilots flying into IMCs could be borne from an unsupported overconfidence
in their own abilities leading to “premature cessation of problem-solving efforts, insufficient checking
of memory retrieval resulting in poorer performance than might otherwise be achieved” [24].
This overconfidence has come to be known as the Dunning–Kruger effect after the study into how
incompetent people in the bottom quartile of abilities overrate their own abilities to accomplish the
requisite task and overate their abilities relative to their peers [25]. Not only do the more incompetent
people lack the requisite skills and knowledge, they also lack the “savvy necessary to recognise
competence, be it their own or anyone else’s” (p. 1126). As Shakespeare commented in As You Like
It: “The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool”. Overconfidence
has been found to be evidenced in occupational groups outside the student subjects of Kruger and
Dunning, e.g., anesthesiologists [26] and senior management [27]. By contrast, the more competent
students had a tendency to underrate their abilities.
Pavel, Robertson, and Harrison [28] replicated Kruger and Dunning’s 1999 Study 3—test of
knowledge of grammar conventions of the English language—using aviation students enrolled in a
university aviation program and obtained similar results. The bottom quartile of aviation students
predicted their score to be on the 68th percentile but achieved an average score on the 10th percentile.
The researchers found this overconfidence amongst the aviation students carried across to sitting the
regulators examinations as well as estimating their piloting skills. For the latter, students ranked
themselves on a scale of 1–10, with an average score of over 7, with the bottom quartile of students
ranking themselves higher than the other three higher quartiles.
2.3.2. Categorization
According to Endsley’s three-step model of situational awareness [29], the first step requires the
pilot to perceive elements in the environment, to detect the cues that indicate there is a change in the
status of the environment in which the aircraft is operating. It would seem a simple task to perceive
the meteorological elements in the flying environment that reduce them to IMCs—that is, the object
up ahead is cloud and it should be avoided so as to avoid spatial disorientation and remain in visual
contact with navigational cues to maintain situational awareness and a safe flight.
Perception will rely on recognition and pattern matching. This can be built through experience
and training. There have been various frames of reference describing this need. In trying to understand
why people do not perceive and recognize items, Clewley and Nixon [30] use categorization theory to
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explain why these are missed or misunderstood. Categorization theory, “proposes that recognizing
entities in the real-world requires a similarity overlap between either a prototypical, ideal case or a
stored exemplar derived from experience” (p. 2). When a person is confronted with a happening,
they are able to place it within an existing category. Previous experience provides the database or
existing structures against which the subject may recognize the elements confronting them in the
environment. These authors summarize two different approaches to categorization, the classical view
where all members are of equal status with similar features. However, the strength of the category
is not always uniform. There can be gradients where one category is much stronger than another.
The strength can develop through how typical it is for the activity and how familiar it is for the person.
This probabilistic approach has less well-defined membership with graduations between them and the
a less well-defined world with fuzzy boundaries, p. 4.
The perception of the elements is most easily made when the element is an exemplar built up from
occurring in normal flight activities which allows for adequate recognition. These exemplars need not
be personally experienced to become readily recognizable. O’Hare and Wiggins [31], surveyed pilots
from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to determine if they used cues from previous
experiences (either the subjects’ own experience or experiences of others) to help overcome critical
flight events. Over half (52.5%) of respondents said they recalled a previous case when experiencing a
critical flight event (CFE) with the most common CFE being weather (46.1%). Nearly 90% said they
found the recalling of a previous case to have been moderately or very useful and close to 85% of
respondents considered the recalled previous case as having been influential in the decision they took
at the time. Recognition of the previous experiences and the relationship to the newly experienced
CFE underpins the categorization process [30].
However, events that are not as often encountered may only be partially recognized or there may
be a delay in recognition. These events known to the pilot, may even have been experienced previously,
but are not as strongly recognized. Finally, the pilot may encounter an event for which there is no
previous experience with a corresponding weak to non-existent recognition leading to a mismanaging
of the flight.
2.3.3. Personal Standards
Not only do incompetent people overrate their own abilities but Kruger and Dunning believe
they lack the cognitive skills and knowledge to be able to assess their own performance [25]. They are
unable to work out that they are not as good as they think they are. Within the aviation system,
individual pilots are often not surrounded by organizational structures [32]. These structures help
the pilots assess their abilities relevant to the flying conditions of the day. This assistance can take the
form of SOPs, including the promulgation of meteorological minima that are required to prevail before
members of the organization go flying. These minima will often be higher than the legal minima set
by the regulator. There can be experienced staff within the organization who oversee and check the
pilot’s flight planning and preflight decision making which, in effect, are helping raise the pilot’s level
of expertise. Hunter et al. describe owner pilots who often do not have a surrounding organizational
structure supporting them as being a predisposing factor for VFR2IMC [33].
3. Methodology
3.1. Research Design
The research utilized an explanatory design. This is a mixed-method approach that commences
with a qualitative study and is followed by a quantitative study [34]. In this type of research design,
the findings from the qualitative study are “explained” with the quantitative data and analysis.
The qualitative study was a collective case study, with 26 cases. The quantitative study was an ex post
facto study, with a sample size of 196.
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The aircraft manufactures included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cessna;
Piper;
Beech;
Amateur;
Cirrus;
Bell;
Mooney;
Robinson;
Eurocopter;
Air Tractor; and
Other.

The other category includes 31 other manufactures, with a single manufacturer having at most
4 safety occurrences and an average of 2 occurrences per manufacture in this category. These were not
included individually as the BITRE (Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport, and Regional Economics)
annual report did not specify the hours associated with these manufacturers, and their associated hours
were grouped in an “other” category. The airspace classifications used in Australia include A, C, D, E,
and G. An additional airspace classification of PRD includes prohibited, restricted, and danger areas.
The quantitative data analysis followed that of previous work, investigating safety occurrences
involving remotely piloted aircraft [38]. The data analysis involved Pearson’s chi-squared tests for
goodness of fit, calculated in Excel. The VFR2IMC data, represented by the observed data (O) and the
expected data (E), came from various sources. Specifically:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Occurrence type—ATSB population (all safety occurrences), over the same time period;
Fatalness—ATSB population, over the same time period;
Operation type—hours reported for each operation type by BITRE;
Aircraft Manufacturer—hours reported for each manufacture by BITRE;
Airspace Classification—ATSB population, over the same time period; and
Month—average monthly rainfall reported by the Bureau of Meteorology.

All data are freely available from the corresponding government database. The statistical
hypotheses are given as
H0 : PVFR2IMC,n = PE,n ,
HA : PVFR2IMC,n , PE,n ,
where P is in reference to the proportions of the n-th category for VFR2IMC and the expected (E)
distribution. The null hypothesis (H0 ) can therefore be expressed as “the proportions of VFR2IMC
safety occurrences are equal to the proportions expected, for the different categories”. Conversely, the
alternative hypothesis (HA ) is that “the proportions are not equal”.
For each of the factors of interest, an ideal way to show the difference between the observed data
and expected data is to calculate the relative percentage differences, deltas (∆), using [38]

(Oi − Ei )
∆i = Pn
× 100%.
i=1 Oi
Using the delta values facilitates a direct comparison between what is observed for VFR2IMC for
each of the categories and what would be expected if the data was a random sample of the expected
data. Specifically, a positive delta infers that a VFR2IMC occurrence is more likely than expected, while
a negative delta infers that a VFR2IMC occurrence is less likely than expected.
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Since year is an interval variable, a suitable parametric test was needed to assess the trend and
statistical significance. Specifically, correlation was used to measure if the number of VFR2IMC
occurrences have reduced over the 17-year span of the study.
4. Qualitative Study
4.1. Aircraft and Operation Types
The study identified 26 ATSB reports with complete information on aircraft information,
weather hazards, fatalities, human factors, and pilot characteristics (flight hours and instrument
rating—although some required data was requests from the ATSB). The aircraft models involved in the
accident are identified in Table 1.
Table 1. Aircraft manufacturers and models involved in the visual flight rule (VFR) flight into instrument
meteorological condition (IMC) (VFR2IMC) occurrences.
Aircraft Manufacturer

Models

Count

Fatal

172
182
206
208
337
PA-28
206
AS350
EC135
56
DH-84
BK117
GA-8
G-525
08-600
TB

2
2
3
1
1
5
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
2
1

Cessna Aircraft Company

Piper Aircraft Corp
Bell Helicopter Co
Aerospatiale Industries
Airbus Helicopters Deutschland
Beech Aircraft Corp
de Havilland Aircraft Pty Ltd.
Eurocopter
Gippsland Aeronautics Pty Ltd.
Kavanagh Balloons
Pacific Aerospace Corporation
SOCATA-Groupe Aerospatiale

1
3
2
1
1

1
1

While it appears that the Cessna aircraft have more occurrences associated with them, this is
clearly a confounding effect given the fact that these are the most common aircraft flying in the GA
industry in Australia. Hence, the reason a follow-up quantitative investigation is necessary.
Most of the aircrafts were involved in private operations (17), comprising mainly of pleasure/travel
and test and carry, while five were chartered flights, with two aerial works and two involving flying
training. Table 2 shows the breakdown of the types of operations for the VFR2IMC occurrences.
The total for each is broken down further, showing the number of operations for those occurrences and
whether they were fatal. Those occurrences that were not fatal are further broken down into those with
serious, minor, or no injuries. Fisher’s exact test for the 4 × 2 (operation vs. fatal/not) is statistically
significant (p = 0.001). That is, private operations are more likely to end fatally, while charter and
training flights are less likely to end fatally. The degree to which this conclusion can be extrapolated
to the population is based on the “randomness” of the investigated sample. That is, has the ATSB
systematically chosen more fatal private operations to investigate, or is the choice to investigate a given
VFR2IMC occurrence independent of the type of operation, or are there any mediating or confounding
variables related to the type of operation. This will be discussed further in the quantitative analysis.
Table 2. Type of operation for the VFR2IMC occurrences. Total breaks down into Fatal and Not. Not
(fatal) breaks down into injury level (serious, minor, and none).
Fatalness

Injury Level

Operation

Total

Fatal

Not

Serious

Minor

None

Private
Charter
Aerial Work
Flying Training

17
5
2
2

13
0
1
0

4
5
1
2

0
1
0
0

0
2
0
0

4
2
1
2
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4.2. Pilot Characteristics
The licenses held by the pilots involved in the VFR2IMC occurrences are indicated in Table 3.
Note that the preliminary report for the most recent fatal accident does not include any information
about the pilot and, hence, is excluded in this section. The data is broken down to show the number of
licenses held for either fatal occurrences or occurrences that were not fatal. Those occurrences that
were not fatal can be further broken down into those with serious, minor, or no injuries. Fisher’s exact
test for the 5 × 2 (license vs. fatal/not) is not significant (p = 0.562). No significant conclusion can be
drawn from this as the investigated sample is not random and the limited resources of the ATSB means
they investigate occurrences that are significant to them; unfortunately, for the entire population of
196 occurrences, license information is not provided.
Table 3. Licenses held by the pilots involved in the VFR2IMC occurrences. Total breaks down into
Fatal and Not. Not (fatal) breaks down into injury level (serious, minor, and none).
Fatalness

Injury Level

License

Total

Fatal

Not

Serious

Minor

None

Private Pilot (Aeroplane)
Private Pilot (Helicopter)
Commercial Pilot (Helicopter)
Commercial Pilot (Aeroplane)
Commercial Pilot (Balloon)

17
2
3
2
1

10
1
2
0
0

7
1
1
2
1

0
0
0
0
1

0
0
1
1
0

7
1
0
1
0

The next considered pilot characteristic was pilot flight experience, represented by total logged
flying hours. Of the 26 investigated VFR2IMC occurrences, only 19 included the total h logged by the
pilot (4 more were provided through email communication with the ATSB). The distribution of flight
hours is illustrated in Figure 2. The hour groups were chosen to correspond to “flight experience”
needed for a private pilot’s license (50 h), a commercial pilot’s license (150 h), and an air transport
pilot’s license (500 h). These categories do not correspond to those licenses and they correspond only
to the equivalent flight hour experience needed for those licenses. The most significant feature here is
that the mode (most common) is clearly for pilots with more than 500 h of flight experience. In fact, if
ranked and plotted, there is a clear exponential trend in the flight hours (r = 0.968, p < 0.01). This then
suggests that not only does flying more hours influence the chance of an occurrence (this influence
alone would be a linear relationship, flying twice as many hours would make it twice as likely to
randomly encounter IMCs from VFRs), it is compounded by experience; that is, overconfidence is likely
to play a significant role in VFR2IMC occurrences. To further investigate the effect of flight experience,
the occurrences were ranked in order of flight hours, and the two groups of fatalness were then tested
using a Mann–Whitney U Test. The result of the test was z = −0.08, p = 0.47. That is, there was no
difference between occurrences grouped by fatalness and ranked by flight h. Therefore, having more
flight experience does not influence the fatalness of a VFR2IMC occurrence. It is worth combining
these two findings; the statement is, that the more experience you have, the more likely it is you will
experience VFR2IMC, but it is not more likely that you will have a fatal occurrence.
The final pilot characteristic of interest was additional ratings. Table 4 shows the breakdown
in ratings held by the pilots involved in the VFR2IMC occurrences. The total for each is further
broken down, showing the highest rating held for those occurrences that were either fatal or not.
Those occurrences that were not fatal are further broken down into those with serious, minor, or no
injuries. For the 26 VFR2IMC occurrences, two are excluded (final reports to be released), and any
of the others that did not include a statement of the ratings held were assumed to be no rating; that
is, the relevance of the rating to the outcome of the occurrence is significant, and should be included,
and if not, then the assumption that no rating was held by the pilot can be made with confidence.
The result in Table 4 show 17 of the 24 occurrences with no additional rating. This is even though
CASA, in its training guidelines, recommends competency standards for private and commercial
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airplane licenses that are related to the management of VFR2IMC risk. Fisher’s exact test for the 3 × 2
(rating vs. fatal/not) gives p = 0.031, which is statistically significant. Therefore, it can be concluded
that an instrument rating will result in a VFR2IMC occurrence not being fatal, while a night VFR rating
will 2020,
increase
the
likelihood
6, x FOR
PEER
REVIEW of a fatal outcome, again, likely due to overconfidence.
10 of 25
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Fatalness
Injury Level
Fatalness
Injury Level
Total
Fatal
Not
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Minor
None
Not
Minor
17 Fatal 9
8
1 Serious2
5
4
4
0
0
0
9
8
1
20
3
30
0
4 0
0 0
03
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0

0

None
5
0
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TheFactors
first causal factor investigated are the environmental hazards associated with the
4.3. Causal
occurrences. These hazards were coded as shown in Table 5; note, multiple codes were applicable to
The first causal
factorand,
investigated
the the
environmental
associated
withkey
thehazards
occurrences.
individual
occurrences
hence, theare
reason
total sums tohazards
more than
26. The three
These
hazards
coded aswith
shown
in Table 5;terrain
note, (mountains,
multiple codes
applicable
to Other
individual
were
cloudswere
(not associated
precipitation),
etc.), were
and cloud
with rain.
significant
hazards
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night,the
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and to
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occurrences
and,
hence,
the reason
total
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more than
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fatal/not)with
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(p (mountains,
= 0.036). Whenetc.),
looking
the delta
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(not vs.
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precipitation),
terrain
andatcloud
with
rain. four
Other
significant
hazards
can
be
identified,
clouds,
terrain,
rain
and
clouds,
and
turbulence.
Clouds
alone
hasfatal/not)
a
hazards included night, trees, fog, and turbulence. Fisher’s exact test for the 9 × 2 (hazard vs.
negative delta, which means occurrences with clouds without precipitation are less likely to result in
was statistically significant (p = 0.036). When looking at the delta values, four primary hazards can be
fatalities than expected, while the other three key hazards are more likely to result in fatalities than
identified, clouds, terrain, rain and clouds, and turbulence. Clouds alone has a negative delta, which
expected.
means occurrences
with clouds without precipitation are less likely to result in fatalities than expected,
The next causal factor was the choice of action taken by the pilot once in IMCs from VFRs. The
while
the
other
three
keyashazards
are more
to result
fatalities than
choices were coded
“continuing
on”, likely
“turned
back”,in“diverted”,
and expected.
“fly around”. Those
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had toback”,
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Fisher’s
exact
test for thethat
4 × 2were
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vs. fatal/not)
is significant
(p then
< 0.001).
The data
shown
in Table
6 clearly
Those
occurrences
initially
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on” and
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“turned
back”,
were
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indicate
that
all
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are
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an
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on”
and
no
other
as “continued on”; that is, to be coded as “turned back”, this had to be the pilot’s first choice.
Fisher’s
or if
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was
taken, it was
done so after
to shown
continueininto
IMCs.
exactaction;
test for
the
4 × 2 (action
fatal/not)
is significant
(p <initially
0.001).choosing
The data
Table
6 clearly
causal factor considered was flight planning, specifically, the level of understanding of
indicate The
thatfinal
all 14
fatal occurrences are associated with an attempt to “continue on” and no other
the relevant forecast and appropriate use of the systems to seek updated weather information. Table
action; or if alternative action was taken, it was done so after initially choosing to continue into IMCs.
7 shows the codes used to classify the weather information sources and the resultant occurrence
counts. The ideal source of weather data, the National Aeronautical Information Processing System
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The final causal factor considered was flight planning, specifically, the level of understanding of
the relevant forecast and appropriate use of the systems to seek updated weather information. Table 7
shows the codes used to classify the weather information sources and the resultant occurrence counts.
The ideal source of weather data, the National Aeronautical Information Processing System (NAIPS),
was used in only 9 of the 26 occurrences. Seven occurrences are believed to have occurred without
the pilot using any aeronautical service to obtain weather information, all of which ended fatally.
There were two occurrences that used verbal means to obtain weather information (via phone or a
direct conversation about weather), with one being fatal and the other not. There was also one flight
that involved a preflight weather briefing, and it is reasonable to assume the instructor in this situation
would have sourced the weather information from NAIPS; this was not fatal. Finally, there were
two attempts to obtain weather information in-flight (and not preflight): one via AWIS (Aerodrome
Weather Information Service) and one via ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service), with the
latter being a fatal occurrence. Fisher’s exact test for the 6 × 2 (weather information vs. fatal/not) is
significant (p = 0.009). The relevant delta values show that the use of NAIPS for aviation weather data
in the preflight planning stage reduced the probability of a VFR2IMC occurrence. Clearly, not seeking
weather data is only associated with fatal occurrences and, hence, if no weather information is used,
the likelihood of a fatal occurrence is increased.
Table 5. Hazards associated with VFR2IMC occurrences. Total breaks down into Fatal and Not.
Not (fatal) breaks down into injury level (serious, minor and none).
Fatalness

Injury Level

Hazard

Total

Fatal

Not

Serious

Minor

None

Clouds
Terrain
Rain/Cloud
Night
Trees
Fog
Turbulence
Rain
Storms

13
10
7
4
5
3
3
2
2

3
8
6
3
3
2
3
1
2

10
2
1
1
2
1
0
1
0

1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

7
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0

Table 6. Pilot actions in VFR2IMC occurrences. Total breaks down into Fatal and Not. Not (fatal)
breaks down into injury level (serious, minor, and none).
Fatalness

Injury Level

Action

Total

Fatal

Not

Serious

Minor

None

Continued On
Turned back
Diverted
Fly around

19
4
2
1

14
0
0
0

5
4
2
1

1
0
0
0

2
0
0
0

2
4
2
1

Table 7. Weather planning information source utilized in the VFR2IMC occurrences. Total breaks down
into Fatal and Not. Not (fatal) breaks down into injury level (serious, minor and none).
Fatalness

Injury Level

Source

Total

Fatal

Not

Serious

Minor

None

NAIPS
None
Verbal
AWIS
Briefing
ATIS

9
7
2
1
1
1

3
7
1
0
0
1

6
0
1
1
1
0

0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0

6
0
1
1
1
0
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4.4. Human Factors Analysis
HFACS was used to gain an in-depth understanding of the human factors involved in the
occurrences. Analysis covered the four levels of failure (unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts,
unsafe supervision, and organizational influences) in addition to the subcategories. Table 8 shows the
total count for each of the HFACS elements for the 26 VFR2IMC occurrences; the total is made up of
fatal and not fatal occurrences. Fisher’s exact test for the complete set of elements was not conducted
(due to computational limitations of the test). However, individual elements were tested.
Table 8. HFACS analysis for the 25 Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) VFR2IMC occurrences.
HFACS

Total

Fatal

Not

Skill based errors
Decision errors
Perceptual errors
Routine violations
Exceptional violations

7
24
16
20
1

4
13
13
13
0

3
11
3
7
1

Physical environment
Technological environment
Adverse mental state
Adverse psychological state
Physical/mental limitations
Crew resource management
Personal readiness

26
0
3
2
2
0
1

14
0
1
1
0
0
1

12
0
2
1
2
0
0

Level 3

Inadequate supervision
Plan inappropriate operation
Fail to correct known problem
Supervisory violation

7
4
1
3

2
0
1
1

5
4
0
2

Level 4

Resource management
Organizational climate
Operational process

1
1
3

0
0
1

1
1
2

Errors
Level 1
Violations
Environment
Level 2

Condition of Operator
Personnel Factors

Table 9 shows the results for the 10 Fisher’s exact tests conducted for the different groupings of
the HFACS elements. Of these, only the difference between the levels (1, 2, 3, and 4) is statistically
significantly different. Specifically, it can be noted that, together, errors and violations occur with
a slightly greater frequency for fatal occurrences than non-fatal occurrences. When looking at just
the different types of errors or the different types of violations, no statistically significant difference
was observed.
Table 9. Results of the Fisher’s exact tests for different levels of HFACS. * Insufficient data.
Parameter

Size

p-Value

Level 1–4 (HFACS)
Level 1 (Unsafe Acts)
Errors
Violations
Level 2 (Preconditions)
Environmental Factors
Condition of Operator
Personnel Factors
Level 3 (Supervision)
Level 4 (Organization)

4×2
2×2
3×2
2×2
3×2
2×2
3×2
2×2
4×2
3×2

0.022
1
0.209
0.381
0.398
1
1
*
0.267
1

5. Quantitative Study
5.1. Analysis Summary
Table 10 shows the results from the chi-squared tests for goodness of fit for each of the six
categorical factors investigated (occurrence type, fatalness, aircraft manufacturer, aircraft operation,
Safety airspace
2020, 6, 19classification, and month of occurrence). All six of the tests were positive, that is, the null13 of 25
hypothesis was rejected for each, and the proportions observed for each of the factors were different
to the proportions expected.

5. Quantitative Study

Table 10. Outputs from Pearson’s chi-squared test for goodness of fit for each of the factors.

5.1. Analysis Summary

Factor

Type

Fatalness

Manu

Op

Airspace

Month

Table 10 showsχ2the results
of fit66for each of the six
96 from the
224chi-squared
68 tests
122for goodness
122
categorical factors investigated
aircraft
manufacturer,
df
2(occurrence
1 type, fatalness,
10
4
5
11 aircraft operation,
airspace classification,
and
month
of
occurrence).
All
six
of
the
tests
were
positive,
p-value
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001
<0.001 that is, the null
reject
reject
rejectfor each
reject
reject were different to
hypothesis was Conclusion
rejected for each,
and thereject
proportions
observed
of the factors
the proportions expected.
5.2. Occurrence Type
Table 10.
from
Pearson’s
chi-squared
test for for
goodness
of fit for each
of comparing
the factors. the
Figure
3 Outputs
shows the
relative
percentage
difference
the occurrence
type
VFR2IMC category to all occurrences reported by the ATSB. The positive differences for accidents
Factor
Type
Fatalness
Manu
Op
Airspace
Month
and serious incidents indicate that VFR2IMC occurrences result in more of these than expected, which
2
96 occurrences
224are more serious.
68
122they result 122
66 than
χ that VFR2IMC
indicates
That is,
in more accidents
df
2
1
10 the expected
4 value. This
5 is also the same
11 for
other occurrences
together,
specifically,
three times
p-value
<0.001occurred<0.001
<0.001
serious
incidents, which
at three times<0.001
the expected<0.001
value. This means
that efforts <0.001
to reduce
Conclusion
reject
reject
reject
reject
reject
reject
VFR2IMC occurrences are essential.

5.3. FatalnessType
5.2. Occurrence
Figure
4 shows
relative
percentage
differencefor
forthe
proportion
of occurrences
that were
Figure
3 shows
the the
relative
percentage
difference
occurrence
type comparing
the fatal,
VFR2IMC
and those that were not in comparing VFR2IMC occurrences to all ATSB-reported occurrences. For a
category to all occurrences reported by the ATSB. The positive differences for accidents and serious
random sample of 200 safety occurrences from the ATSB database, the expected number of fatal
incidents indicate that VFR2IMC occurrences result in more of these than expected, which indicates that
accidents in that sample would be slightly less than 1. For the VFR2IMC occurrences, there are 14
VFR2IMC
occurrences
are more
That
they result
in moreisaccidents
other occurrences
fatal accidents.
The exact
ratioserious.
of observed
tois,
expected
occurrences
17.5. That than
is, compared
to all
together,
three times
the expected
value.
This isisalso
the18
same
formore
serious
otherspecifically,
types of occurrences
together,
a VFR2IMC
occurrence
almost
times
likelyincidents,
to be fatal.which
occurred
at three timesthe
thepoint
expected
value.
that that
efforts
to reduce
VFR2IMC
This re-emphasizes
in Section
5.2, This
that itmeans
is essential
additional
efforts
are takenoccurrences
to try
and
reduce
VFR2IMC
occurrences.
are essential.
90K

15

Relative % Difference

70K
5
60K
0

50K

-5

40K
30K

-10
20K
-15

Count (All ATSB Occurrences)

80K

10

10K

-20

0
Accidents

Serious incidents

Incidents

Figure 3. Delta values for each type of occurrence. Expected (secondary axis), all ATSB occurrences
(line plot).

5.3. Fatalness
Figure 4 shows the relative percentage difference for proportion of occurrences that were fatal,
and those that were not in comparing VFR2IMC occurrences to all ATSB-reported occurrences.
For a random sample of 200 safety occurrences from the ATSB database, the expected number of
fatal accidents in that sample would be slightly less than 1. For the VFR2IMC occurrences, there are
14 fatal accidents. The exact ratio of observed to expected occurrences is 17.5. That is, compared to all
other types of occurrences together, a VFR2IMC occurrence is almost 18 times more likely to be fatal.
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6. Contributing Factors
6.1. Overconfidence
While private pilots have been deemed competent to fly by the regulators through training,
ground examinations, and a flight test, they typically do not advance to the stage of obtaining an IFR
rating. The over representation of these pilots flying into IMCs when on a VFR flight may be due to
the Dunning–Kruger effect, whereby they overestimate their flying skills and decision making when
faced with deteriorating weather conditions during their flight. The pilot’s overconfidence leads them
to flying through cloud or poor visibility in the expectation they will “pop-out” on the other side of the
cloud into better weather and that their flying abilities are such that they can handle the loss of visual
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cues and maintain the aircraft in an upright attitude. Hunter et al. [33] confirms this in the finding
that respondents who had actually flown into IMCs had also a greater history of other hazardous
events in their flying careers—it is not just flights in poor weather conditions where the overconfidence
is displayed.
Overconfidence by inexperienced operators across other sectors has long been noted in the
literature. Keren noted how inexperienced bridge (cards) players had an overinflated confidence in
their ability to win as compared to expert bridge players [39]. Keren noted that as well as overconfidence,
the inexperienced players believed that the play of the cards would follow an assumed optimal pattern
that left no room for vagaries of opposition players or any other variables in the playing of the cards.
Much in the same way, the inexperienced pilots proceeding from VFRs into IMCs may have a belief
that the flight will follow a predictable pattern—a pattern that the inexperienced overconfident pilot
believes is predictable—and, thus, they will survive the flight into IMCs. Hunter’s et al. survey of
pilots who had entered IMCs from VFRs found that nearly a third of these pilots did so deliberately
and 13% of these pilots chose to enter IMCs because they thought they could handle it [33].
During a flight between two locations in New South Wales in 2012, a C182 was faced with a
lowering cloud base, and before reaching the destination, that aircraft flew into terrain (CFIT accident) at
an elevation that was above the cloud base [40]. The pilot held a private license and had approximately
300 h experience (the pilot logbook was presumed to have been lost in the accident). Although the
cloud base at the departure aerodrome was at 12,000 feet above ground level, the pilot learned through
a conversation with a friend based at the destination aerodrome that the meteorological conditions
closer to the destination would probably prohibit VFR flight. The pilot decided to depart based on a
decision to turn around should the conditions get too bad for VFR flight. Keren suggested that the
overconfidence levels of the inexperienced card players may have arisen from the mental models of the
situation and that these models are built up from past experiences [39]. The pilot’s overconfidence in
his abilities to be able to cope with deteriorating conditions during the accident flight was buttressed
by having flown regularly in the area. Witness statements indicate that the cloud base was lower than
the impact point and, thus, as the cloud based lowered, the pilot was forced to fly at an ever-lower
altitude until he flew into cloud and impacted the terrain [40].
Another example of overconfidence in ability is illustrated by a flight into Sunshine Coast Airport
in ever-worsening meteorological conditions [41]. As the weather became worse and the aircraft was
getting closer to these conditions, air traffic control (ATC) provided other options for the pilot to
follow to avoid the bad weather at the aerodrome. However, the pilot continued the flight, descending
ever lower to avoid the cloud and rain. After the aircraft entered, the aerodrome circuit ATC lost
visual contact with the aircraft and contact was not re-established until the aircraft was on short finals.
Despite the extremely poor conditions, the pilot was able to successfully land the aircraft. This pilot’s
overconfidence was supported again by familiarity with the locality and technology with 2 GPS and
2 iPads with planning software onboard the aircraft.
6.2. Categorization
One example of the probabilistic approach with less strongly developed exemplars is the crash of
a helicopter onto Fox Glacier in the South Island of New Zealand in 2015 [42]. The purpose of the flight
had been to take the passengers up the glacier for sightseeing purposes. The pilot landed on a shelf
towards the top of the glacier allowing the passengers to get out and walk around. On leaving the
shelf to return to base at the foot of the glacier, the helicopter, at a level attitude with but a high rate of
descent, impacted with the glacier, killing all six passengers and the pilot. On the day of the accident
flight, the weather was changeable, with snow at times, and often below minima. At the start of the
day, there was reduced visibility and the glacier was shrouded in cloud. Flights planned for early in
the day had been cancelled due to the weather conditions. This would seem to be a strong exemplar
that the pilot could easily recognize through his own previous experience, as well as the experience
of other pilots in the vicinity who cancelled flights due to the weather conditions. As the morning
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progressed, there was an improvement, and photographs from a webcam show a lifting of the cloud
base higher up the glacier. The decision to fly could have been influenced by what Jensen [43] describes
as “anchoring”. People use a datum or anchoring point to which they measure against when making
decisions. For weather-based decisions, this anchoring point can often be previous weather conditions
rather than set minima—whether the minima be set by the regulator, the organization for which the
pilot flies, or personally set minima. It would seem as if the weather was improving. If there had been
CAVOK conditions in the lead-up to the day of the flight and then the cloud base had lowered to the
levels present at the time of the flight, the measure against the anchoring point of fine weather of the
deteriorating conditions may have caused the pilot to cancel the accident flight. For the pilot in the
accident flight, the lifting of the cloud meant there was an improvement in conditions and, thus, he
could go flying. The exemplar of the lower cloud base had now become fuzzy, or less certain. Whilst
there were VFR conditions at the base from which the flight departed—and conditions were above
both the legal minima and the organization’s minima [42]—the changeable cloud conditions at the
higher levels of the glacier made it difficult for the pilot to perceive and pattern-match the cues in the
environment with the possibility of proceeding from VFRs into IMCs. After allowing the passengers to
walk on the glacier, the report states that “the pilot would have been unlikely to take off if conditions
of reduced visibility were present in all directions. It is very unlikely that the pilot would have
intentionally entered cloud after takeoff. However, the weather was marginal, and conditions were
fluctuating quickly [42]. The report could not definitively determine that the pilot entered IMCs, but
the effects of poor weather conditions such as cloud, precipitation, flat light conditions, or condensation
on the windscreen contributed to the accident occurring (p. 1). The pilot appears to have been unable
to match the existing environmental cues with those of his pre-existing stored exemplar.
As Clewley and Nixon summarize, environments that have been previously experienced and are
typical provide a “relatively friendly situation to which pilots are well adapted” [30]. The exemplars
arising from the familiar and typical situations may be tightly defined, and if there is a significant
variation from the usually experienced, the new situation will “prompt alarm, and response protocols
may become vulnerable” (p. 11).
6.3. Personal Standards
The ATSB in their educational brochure offers support for all pilots on the dangers of VFR flights
continuing into IMCs, suggesting that all pilots, no matter their level of experience, set personal
minima for their flying, including meteorological limits [44]. A FAA-sponsored training program
sought to inculcate, in pilots, the need to establish the risk factors for each flight and the setting of
personal minima before accepting the identified risks [32]. The researchers, like the ATSB, believed in
the strength of personal minima as against those externally imposed, and this was supported by the
participants in the training program, with 82% saying they use personal minima in preflight decision
making. Additionally, the setting of personal minima was not found to be a difficult task, with over 90%
of the training program participants declaring it to be an easily understood concept [32]. Unfortunately,
Hunter et al. found that the setting of personal minima amongst the group of pilots who had flown
from VFR into IMCs were “too liberal” (p. 183) when compared to groups of pilots who had not
entered IMCs [33].
Despite the importance of personal minima, the Dunning–Kruger effect may be blinding pilots to
recognizing that not only do they not have the required degree of flying skills, but also to the fact that
they do not have the knowledge to evaluate their performance, including the important requirement
of obtaining accurate, up-to-date weather forecasts and reports.
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7. Discussion
7.1. Findings
A key difference between the results found in this study and previous literature is that pilot
experience did not positively influence VFR2IMC occurrences. Specifically, the proportion of
occurrences associated with pilots with over 500 h of experience was much higher than all the other
experience categories. This contradicted the proposed research hypothesis that flight experience should
have a positive influence. Previous research [3] reported the proportions expected for 2000–5000 h was
11.7%, while this dataset had 26% of occurrence at this level of experience. CASA notes that Australia
has less risk due to weather and low values for lowest safe altitudes. As such, greater overconfidence
could be present in Australian pilots.
Previous work also showed that pilots with less than 250 h accounted for 23.4% of occurrences.
Based on this, it was hypothesized that student pilots and training operations would specifically be
more likely to result in inadvertent flight into IMCs. All commercial operations actually had negative
delta values, indicating that relative to the number of hours flown, the number of occurrences were less
than expected. Only private operations showed an observed value greater than expected, indicating
that VFR2IMC is a greater concern for private operations and is associated with poor planning and
preflight preparation.
The final research hypothesis posed was that the type of aircraft would not influence the likelihood
of VFR2IMC. This was not found to be the case, with Cessna and Piper aircraft being more likely
to be involved in these occurrences, and Robinson helicopters less likely to be involved. It is not
expected that aircraft type is in some way directly correlated with VFR2IMC and, rather, that there is a
confounding variable responsible for the observed association. This is discussed further below in the
assumptions and limitations.
There are a number of novel findings that have not previously been presented in the literature.
The first of this is the association between VFR2IMC occurrences in months with less average rainfall.
This result, supported by the lack of proper preflight planning using NAIPS by many pilots, is related
to familiarity and overconfidence. The assumption that pilots make is that the weather now will be the
weather later, and the time of year is associated with good weather. As such, flights are undertaken with
no expectation to encounter inclement weather, meaning the pilots are unprepared for the situation.
This overconfidence and familiarity would also make it more likely for pilots to assume the weather
system or cloud is localized and, therefore, the extant of the threat is not appreciated.
The most crucial finding concerns the actions taken by pilots. While in Section 4.3 (Table 6), it is
noted that continuing on is more likely to result in a fatal outcome, the key question to ask is what
happened in the cases that were not fatal; more specifically, what happened in the occurrences that did
not result in an accident (crash and/or fatality)? These 9 occurrences fall into two broad categories.
The first (3 cases) is that the pilot held an IFR rating. The more interesting cases are those that are
coded as “support”, which occurred in 7 of the 9 occurrences. Here, support was sought and given
from either other pilots in the area or ATC, to help talk the pilot through the situation. This will be
discussed further below in recommendations.
7.2. Assumptions and Limitations
There are a number of other factors that would have been interesting to code from the accident
reports. Two demographics, gender and age, would have been interesting to determine if male pilots
were more likely to engage in the risky behavior of continuing on into IMCs, and how age moderated
the choice. Unfortunately, the reports did not provide sufficient data to test either of these hypotheses.
Similarly, many of the factors investigated in the qualitative study could not be explained with a
quantitative study as the data were not sufficient due to a lack of detailed information.
A crucial assumption made is that the data from the ATSB database are complete and correct.
It should be noted that, according to the European Spreadsheet Risks Interest Group, over 90% of
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spreadsheets contain an error [45]. Most of these errors are associated with mathematical operations,
resulting in computational errors. The ATSB data is presented as a spreadsheet as extracted from their
database. Assuming the data are entered faithfully, it should then be accurately reproduced.
As previously mentioned, it is assumed that the sample of investigated occurrences is random.
The ATSB sets out priority guidelines, and it is interesting to note that as an ongoing issue, which
primarily involves private operations, VFR2IMC does not fall under the aviation broad hierarchy
which reflect the priorities for investigation. As such, it is reasonable to assume that no systematic bias
exists to investigate one type of VFR2IMC occurrence over another.
There is a limitation with regards to the aircraft manufacture. The current dataset does not account
for the confounding effect between aircraft manufacturer and type of operation. In private operations,
the common status of Cessna and Piper aircraft mean they are far more likely to be involved in private
operations. It is assumed that if this confounding influence was factored into a measure of association,
then the differences observed in aircraft manufacturer would be accounted for by differences in the
type of operation.
Potentially the most interesting limitation to note in this work is the HFACS framework. While
being an “industry standard” in aviation, for VFR2IMC, which is a significant issue in private operations,
there are little to no failures that can be attributed to “unsafe supervision” and “organizational
influences”, as these are not applicable in private operations. There are many directions this discussion
could proceed in, for example, the view of the regulator as a supervisory organization, the need for
private pilots to peer supervise, and many more.
7.3. Recommendations and Future Work
Although education efforts continue to try and reduce the number of VFR2IMC occurrences, the
numbers suggest that they are not decreasing. Standard recommendations for inadvertent flight into
IMCs already make it clear what the preventative and corrective actions should be. Pilots should
always carry out a detailed review of weather and establish suitable minima, and weather conditions
should be monitored throughout the flight. As conditions deteriorate, turning back should always be
the first action. When stuck in IMC, a mayday radio call should be used, implementing the three “C’s”
of contact, confess, and comply. The best way for these findings to be used is for the safety authority to
utilize case reports in safety publications where pilots share their safe recovery accounts. The new
findings from this work that pilots need to be mindful of, is the fact that occurrences are more likely in
months where rain is not expected.
Future work is planned to understand the fatalness of all safety occurrences in aviation and how
VFR2IMC fits in and compares with all types of occurrences. Following this work, the key question
posed is which types of aviation safety occurrences in Australia are more fatal than VFR2IMC.
8. Conclusions
Prior studies have reported quantitative data that is from before 2013 [46], and almost exclusively
in the US context [3,9,17,46,47]. In this work, we have reviewed Australian aviation safety occurrences
over a 17 year timeframe, which facilitates a continuation of the work previously reported in Australia
from 1976 to 2003 [20].
In terms of both the type of occurrence (accident or incident) and the fatalness of those occurrences,
first and foremost, we note similar trends to all of the previous studies. If VFR2IMC occurs, then it is
disproportionately more likely to result in an accident and to end fatally. The specific numbers for
Australia from 2003 to 2019 are 10.2% of VFR2IMC occurrences are accidents, compared to 3.5% of all
occurrences in the ATSB database for the same period and, more extremely disproportionally, 75% of
VFR2IMC accidents are fatal accidents, compared to 12.4% for all accidents in the ATSB database for
the same period.
When looking at the type of operation, private aviation activities are more likely to be involved in
VFR2IMC occurrences. The number of reported occurrences was 3 times more than expected relative
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to the number of hours flown in each type of activity. As such, aerial work operations had significantly
less occurrences of VFR2IMC relative to the number of h flown, at over 4 times less than expected.
These results both influenced the aircraft that are associated with VFR2IMC occurrences. That is,
those aircraft more typically owned and operated in private aviation activities were more likely to
be involved in VFR2IMC occurrences, specifically, Cessna and Piper aircraft, accounting for almost
1.5 times more occurrences than expected relative to the number of hours flown. Similarly, for the
Robinson helicopter, which is used extensively in aerial work in Australia, it had almost 8 times less
occurrences than expected relative to the number of hours flown. It is important to note here that no
direct influence of the aircraft is expected to account for the likelihood of VFR2IMC occurrences.
Even though the type of license had no significant link with fatalness, the type of rating held
was associated with fatalness; specifically, holding only a night VFR rating was associated with an
increased likelihood of a fatal occurrence. That is, of the 5 accidents where the “highest” rating held
by the pilot was a night VFR rating, 4 of these ended fatally, that is, 80%; by contrast, for pilots with
neither a night VFR nor an instrument rating, approximately 53% of these accidents ended fatally.
The most interesting finding, which is in contrast to some previously published results, is that there
was a clear association with the likelihood of a VFR2IMC occurrence, and the more flight experience a
pilot had. That is, there were more accidents where the pilot had in excess of 5000 h of flight experience
than when the pilot only had double-digit values for h of flight experience.
Environmental hazards (clouds, terrain, and cloud with rain) were a strong indicator not only of the
frequency of accidents, but also of fatalness. The action a pilot takes when encountering IMC conditions,
particularly the action to continue into IMCs, led to more accidents and fatalities. This finding is
associated with the HFACS analysis which showed that errors (clearance, altitude/clearance, aircraft
control) and violations occur with slightly greater frequency with fatal occurrences than non-fatal
occurrences. A final contributing factor relates to preflight planning. Pilots who used NAIPS to access
weather data had greatly reduced chances of experiencing a VFR2IMC occurrence, while those that did
not use NAIPS were more likely to experience a fatal occurrence. Combining all the conclusions, the
primary combination of factors likely to result in a fatal VFR2IMC occurrence are encountering cloud
with rain, having undertaken no correct and thorough preflight weather assessment, for a flight over
elevated rough terrain with trees, then not immediately turning around (and potentially climbing),
and not making a mayday call to support this action.
The yearly count is significant to consider. In the study by Batt and O’Hare [20], there were
491 total occurrences in the ATSB database from September of 1976 to March of 2003. This gives
18.5 occurrences a year during a period in time where aviation was growing (7041 registered aircraft in
1979, growing to 16,900 registered aircraft in 2000). However, looking at recent traffic data, we note the
aviation industry has stagnated, if not declined, in terms of hours over the last several years. Hence,
while there is a reduction from 18.5 occurrences per year between 1976 and 2003, to 11.5 occurrences per
year between 2003 and 2019, there has been no noticeable reduction in occurrence per year since 2003.
Looking at the BITRE traffic data, total flying hours increased from 1985 to 1999, spiked up in 2005, and
has remained constant around 3.5 million hours since then. As such, even when factoring in the total
number of h flown over the periods of time, there has been no reduction on VFR2IMC occurrences in
the last 15 years. Noting that the old ATSB data is not available, it would still be reasonable to assume
that Batt and O’Hare would have noted that per flying hour, the number of occurrences decreased
from 1976 to 2003.
Pilots should have requisite experience and qualifications to meet the minimum standards in
Australia. However, the study shows that pilots with VFR night ratings were more likely to experience
fatal occurrences, implying that even though pilots make an accurate assessment of the hazard situation,
their decision to continue flight into adverse weather conditions was a result of overconfidence in their
ability and unrealistic optimism about being able to control the aircraft and avoid personal harm.
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